Fog architectures are currently present in many applications. Constrained devices equipped with sensors produce measurements that will be sent to a nearby gateway, called the fog. The fog verifies, aggregates and forwards them to the server. Group authentication among these devices allows them to securely accept messages of the group members, resulting in faster updates in their process. When defining a security scheme, it should be considered that edge and fog devices are susceptible to attacks. Privacy of the devices should be guaranteed, with respect to outsiders and the fog. It should be impossible to track the connection pattern of devices with different fogs, even if several fogs are captured by an attacker. Inclusion of protection against potentially malicious fogs has not yet been considered in literature, especially not for group-based communications. We present a server-controlled group authentication and key agreement scheme, executed by the fog in collaboration with the devices that it can reach. The server, assumed to be fully trusted, is responsible for the registration and authorisation of the devices and initiates the key update process, whereas the fog takes care of the secure distribution process among its members. At the end, all entities in the group are ensured to possess the correct group key. Moreover, a pairwise secret key between device and server is obtained during the process. The proposed scheme is very efficient as it relies on elliptic curve cryptography and Lagrange interpolation. No initially shared secret key material among the entities needs to be pre-stored.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is currently involved in many applications, offering a wide variety of services to users. A few years ago, fog computing was proposed as a paradigm to extend the computation, storage and application services to the edge of the network [1] . Fog computing can be considered as a complement of the cloud computing near the IoT devices. The proximity of the fog to the end-users and the IoT devices enhances the QoS and reduces latency [2] . In the fog architecture, the fog takes care of local data analysis and storage at the ground (field) whereas the cloud performs The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Junaid Arshad .
global data analysis and storage [3] . Surveys [4] - [6] provide a clear summary of the advantages and the efficiency of fog computing compared to cloud computing in terms of location awareness, hardware size, easy deployment, decentralized and simplified operations, time criticalness, internet connectivity and bandwidth usage. Several use cases based on fog computing in the sphere of health care systems [6] - [8] , smart traffic lights and connected cars, decentralized smart building control [9] , big data analysis for smart cities [10] , intelligent transport systems [11] , [12] are well known.
The use of group keys in communication increases the efficiency as it allows to ensure authenticity of a broadcasted message and to identify potential issues by a larger group. The inclusion of group authentication into the fog architecture VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ has the advantage that all devices in each other's vicinity are able to immediately verify the authenticity of the message if broadcasted. The devices do not need to wait for confirmation either from the fog or from the server. It is clear that the larger the group, the higher the attack surface, as more users are aware of the same key and can be subject to an attack. Therefore, it is very important to regularly update this group key. In case of moving devices, like in the use case of vehicular networks, the group structure changes frequently. Most group authentication schemes in literature concentrate on communication between devices in a group and the gateway without involving the server. We believe that it is important to include the server into the process as it has lower probability of being compromised compared to the fog since it is not located in the field and is more powerful. Doing so avoids that devices completely depend on the fog for key distribution. The server can enforce strict security management, like imposing regular group key updates to the fog and involving it is the only possibility to guarantee device anonymity towards the fog. Anonymity is very relevant and should be taken into account due to growing privacy concerns.
This paper is organised as follows. We start by a discussion on related work in Section II. The required preliminaries with respect to security mechanisms and properties are provided in Section III. The actual scheme is presented in Section IV. We then proceed with protocol verification based on Rubin logic in Section V followed by security analysis in Section VI. Performance evaluation is presented in Section VII and we finish with a conclusion in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
We first discuss related work in the context of client-server architectures, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), and later for fog architectures.
A. CLIENT-SERVER ARCHITECTURE
Authentication of an IoT device to another entity, so-called client-server scenario, is well studied. Many surveys, like most recent [13] , have been made on this topic. In particular, when the client represents a device with user interaction, e.g. requiring the usage of a smart card or smart phone, a multitude of two-factor and three-factor authentication schemes exist in literature. For instance, in [14] , a symmetric key-based scheme offering mutual authentication with anonymity and untraceability has been proposed. In [15] , [16] , also protection against an honest but curious trusted third party (TTP) has been included, but requires public key based operations, being elliptic curves in [15] and chaos-based operations in [16] .
When the client represents a device, the list of mutual identity based authentication schemes in literature is more restricted, with the most relevant ones [17] - [21] . In [20] , [21] , the architecture consists of an interactive TTP, which is not the case in [17] - [19] . Moreover, the schemes of [17] - [19] offer anonymity of the client.
B. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
WSNs present an important part of IoT. For this type of networks several group authentication and key management schemes have been proposed, based on symmetric, public key or hybrid mechanisms. There are two main categories in this type of schemes, corresponding with a hierarchical and non-hierarchical group structure. Symmetric key based proposals mainly consider a hierarchical architecture [22] - [24] as do several hybrid schemes [25] - [28] . Hierarchical network structures are often less flexible and efficient, since it is not possible to create custom and ad-hoc groups. They are mainly limited to static architectures.
The setting, mostly related to fog architecture, corresponds to the one of non-hierarchical or distributed networks, where one of the nodes takes the role of group leader. Here, we can distinguish the following schemes [29] - [33] . In [29] , a symmetric key based scheme has been proposed in which a cloud server appoints one of the members of the WSN as group leader and shares the required key material with it. Another symmetric key based solution is proposed in [30] , for which a robot-assisted network bootstrapping technique is put forward. In our opinion, the presence of a robot to distribute key material is not a very realistic assumption. The schemes in [31] , [32] are based on a key tree which results in communication and computation costs which linearly increase with the number of group members. Finally, in [33] , a secure and efficient key management scheme is proposed for multicast communication based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). Due to the nature of their architecture, none of these proposed schemes offer anonymity of the group members.
C. FOG ARCHITECTURE
For architectures including the fog, often called tripartite architectures (architectures with three types of participants), several identity-based mutual authentication schemes have been proposed. We can distinguish symmetric key based schemes like e.g. [34] - [37] , and public key based schemes like e.g. [38] - [40] . The main disadvantage of the symmetric key based schemes is their inability to offer anonymity, as discussed in [41] . The scheme in [40] proposes a secure identity based mutual authentication scheme, applicable to mobile distributed computing environments but fails to offer anonymity and needs compute intensive pairing operations. A key agreement scheme for a fog-based healthcare application is proposed in [39] , as an improvement of [38] by including protection for perfect forward secrecy. The scheme in [39] is able to offer anonymity, but requires a smart card based entry and relies on compute intensive pairing operations. Contribution [42] is proposed for operations in mobile distributed computing environments in which the end device first communicates with the authentication server that provides the access control to the application server. However, no anonymity is offered in here. Finally, in [43] , an efficient, elliptic curve and identity based mutual authentication protocol with anonymity protection for devices is proposed. This scheme also offers protection in case of a Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) adversary model [44] .
In [45] , a group key is constructed by the fog based on partial secrets shared by the server with each of the IoT devices belonging to that group. This key is used to guarantee secure data uploading between the server and the fog. As far as the authors are aware, there is no real group key management scheme through which all entities including server, fog and devices, possess a common shared key.
III. PRELIMINARIES A. SECURITY MECHANISMS
The proposed scheme heavily relies on ECC [46] as it offers lightweight public key cryptographic (PKC) solutions. Denote the elliptic curve EC in the finite field F p by E p(a,b) , and the base point generator of prime order q by P. All points on E p(a,b) , together with the infinite point form an additive group. In [47] , [48] standardised curve parameters are described.
The product R = rP = (R x , R y ) with r ∈ F q and R x , R y ∈ F p results in a point of the EC and represents an EC multiplication. When we send an EC point, it is sufficient to send its x coordinate, together with a single sign bit, cf. the SEC1 based encoding [49] . The scheme relies on two computational hard problems.
• The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). This problem states that given two points R and Q of an additive group G, generated by an elliptic curve (EC) of order q, it is computationally hard for any polynomial-time bounded algorithm to determine a parameter x ∈ F q , such that Q = xR.
• The Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Problem (ECDHP). Given two points R = xP, Q = yP of an additive group G, generated by an EC of order q with two unknown parameters x, y ∈ F q , it is computationally hard for any polynomial-time bounded algorithm to determine the EC point xyP.
We will use the Schnorr signature algorithm to compute signatures [50] . In the Schnorr algorithm, the sender chooses a random value u in With respect to computational complexity, the impact for the generation is mostly determined by the EC multiplication, whereas for the verification there are two EC multiplications and one EC addition required.
We denote the operation H as the one-way cryptographic hash function (e.g. SHA2 or SHA3) that results in an element of F p . The encryption of a message M using secret key K is denoted by C = E K (M ) and decryption by M = D K (C). As encryption algorithm AES or even a lightweight cryptographic algorithm can be used. The concatenation of two messages M 1 and M 2 is denoted by M 1 M 2 . We assume that these functions and the EC parameters, together with the EC operations, are implemented in each entity participating the scheme.
B. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
We here consider a so-called fog architecture, as depicted in Figure 1 . This architecture consists on the bottom layer of heterogeneous IoT devices, which are the most constrained devices in the network. In the middle, a gateway also called fog is situated, which collects, filters, and aggregates the data of the devices and further forwards them to the server. On the top, a powerful server mostly located in the cloud, is positioned. On the server, the data are securely stored and eventually analysed. This data can then be later used by a whole set of applications, if the required authorisation is assigned. The focus of this paper is on addressing the security issues present in the fog architecture and not on access control of applications or users to the data stored on the server (cf. [51] for survey).
C. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
First of all, the proposed scheme satisfies general security features.
• Authentication: all entities in the scheme should be authenticated. It should not be possible for an attacker to take over the position of the one claimed to be involved in the system. As a result, this property avoids man-inthe-middle attacks and impersonation attacks.
• Integrity: it should not be possible to alter the message without it being noticed by the intended receiver.
• Anonymity: it should not be possible by an outsider and even group member (device and fog) to derive the identity of the sending device in the group.
• Unlinkability: an outsider, fog or other device should not be able to link the participation of a certain device to different groups coordinated by different fogs.
• Group forward secrecy: if one of the long-term private keys of the devices or fog is leaked, access is no longer allowed to group communication content.
• Backward confidentiality: devices who join the group cannot get the former group keys from their present key.
• Perfect forward secrecy: previous group keys should be still secure even if the long-term secrets are compromised during an attack. The presented fog architecture realises additional security features being:
• By the end of the process, both fog and cloud are ensured that all entities of the group possess the required group key.
• The devices in the group are ensured that the fog has a secure relation with the server.
• By the end of the process, both a group key among all entities and a common pairwise key between device and fog, between device and server, and between fog and server, are derived.
IV. SECURITY SCHEME
The proposed scheme consists of three different phases: initialisation phase, actual group authentication and key agreement phase, and the communication phase.
A. INITIALISATION PHASE
All entities are identified by their public key. We here assume that devices, fog and server in the possession of a public key, are authorised by a trusted third party to participate in the scheme. Note that efficient certificate schemes, like Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone (ECQV) mechanisms [52] , exist to construct the public key given identity and certificate, where the certificate has a length equal to the length of a point of the elliptic curve. For simplicity in the explanation, we use the public key of the entity as reference to the identity. We also assume that the server possesses the list of authorised devices. We further consider that the server has computed for each fog a random point V fj = v fj G with v fj a randomly chosen element of F p . This value V fj is public. The server keeps the list {v fj , V fj } j for all the j fogs in its control range. The private/public key pairs of the i-th device is noted by (d i , Q i ), the j-th fog by (d fj , Q fj ) and server with identity ID ser by (d ser , Q ser ). The device and fog install all the required security mechanisms, together with the public key of the server Q ser .
In the initialisation phase, the group structure should be established and stored both at the fog for its specific group and at the server for all the groups. We propose the following two set-ups, corresponding to a static and dynamic topology.
1) STATIC TOPOLOGY
This scenario is applicable in the smart grid domain, where smart meters first register to the operator and subsequently become assigned to the corresponding local aggregator. This means the device registers with a server and has to get a fog assigned. For simplicity in notation, let us assume that the fog with public key Q f and associated random value V f is selected. The different steps are presented in Figure 2 .
In order to hide the identity of the device to the fog, we apply a mechanism used in Monero blockchains to achieve anonymity of the transactions [53] . Suppose the device sends the following message to the server
a randomly chosen element of F q and K = w i Q ser . Upon arrival of this message, the server is able to decrypt the message, to retrieve the device identity, to verify the hash and to check the authorisation. Next, it computes a new public key for the device based on the fog to which it will be assigned,
and forward all the received messages to the device.
Then, the device computes d
With this value, the device is able to verify the hash value and to be ensured that the message comes from the server. If positive, the device installs 
2) DYNAMIC TOPOLOGY
In this scenario, the device moves across areas covered by different fogs, like for instance in vehicular ad hoc networks where the fog represents the roadside unit (RSU), the device computes for each fog upon its arrival at TS its new public key pair (d f i , Q f i ) based on the random value V f of the fog and timestamp TS like before. Note that this process is initiated after receiving a broadcast message of the fog containing (V f , Q f ). The different steps for this topology are presented in Figure 3 .
As a consequence, the device constructs the mes-
The message is then sent to the fog, which forwards the message, after adding its own identity, to the server. The fog also temporarily stores this hash value together with W i , TS. The server first computes 
B. GROUP AUTHENTICATION AND KEY AGREEMENT PHASE
In this phase, we distinguish four major steps: request of update, response by devices, response by fog, and acknowledgements. These steps are depicted in Figure 7 .
1) STEP 1 : REQUEST OF UPDATE
This phase should be initialised by the fog (potentially after a trigger of the server) by sending the request
Here, M ReqFog refers to the request message of update and the EC point R f = r f G, with r f a unique random value (nonce) chosen by the fog. Moreover, the point R f needs to be signed by the fog in order to guarantee the authenticity.
Upon arrival of this message, the server first verifies the signature using Q f . After a positive check, the server chooses also a unique random value r s (nonce) and computes R s = r s G. Then, for all of the n members in the group, the server computes the points K i = r s Q f i + d ser W i and
Next, using these n + 1 points {K 1 , ..., K n , K f } (x, y coordinates consist of the first and last 128 bits) a polynomial of degree n is constructed by means of the Lagrange interpolation. The y coordinate of the intersection of the polynomial with the Y-axis, i.e., (0, GK ), is now taken as the secret group key GK . To finalise this step, the message M ReqSer , {R f , R s , H (GK )} d ser is sent to the fog and further forwarded to the devices in its group after a positive verification of the signature.
The server stores the group key GK , the common shared key with the fog K f , and for each group member the individual shared key K i with i ∈ {1, ..., n}. 
Then, thanks to the value N f i , the fog is able to identify the device sending the message and thus to decrypt the other part of the message C f i in order to find K i . Using all received values, together with its own point K f = d f R s + r f Q ser , the fog is able to reconstruct the polynomial and to find the corresponding intersection with the Y-axis and thus the group key GK .
Next, the fog derives n other points P i of the polynomial and sends the values (P 1 , ..., P n ) to the devices in its group.
4) STEP 4 : ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Upon arrival of this message, the device constructs also by means of Lagrange interpolation the function going through the points (P 1 , ..., P n ) and its own point K i . After intersection with the Y-axis, the point GK should be found for which H (GK ) corresponds with the value received during the message request of the server. If so, the device is ensured of the authenticity of the response of the fog. The device chooses a new random w n i , computes W n i = w n i G, h = H (GK , W n i , W i ), s = w n i − hd f i and sends W i , W n i , s to the fog. Upon receiving this message from the device, the fog computes h = H (GK , W n i , W i ), and verifies sG = W n i −hQ f i . After a successful verification, it then replaces W i by W n i and forwards the received messages to the server.
The server will now execute the same previous steps as the fog: compute h, verify sG and replace W i by W n i . Now the server is ensured that all involved entities share the same group key GK and has updated the temporary key material of each IoT device.
C. COMMUNICATION PHASE
There are two possibilities in this phase for the communication of messages from devices to server, either encrypted or not encrypted, but in any case, authenticated by the group key.
1) ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATION
The device shares the key K i with the server, which is used to encrypt the message C i = E K i (M ). In order to hide the identity, the device is limited to sending at fixed timestamps TS and computes the corresponding value H (K i TS). Next, in order to allow the fog to verify the authenticity of the message, the following hash value should be included H i = H (TS H (K i TS) C i GK ). Consequently, the message to be sent equals to TS, H (K i TS), C i , H i . After verification of H i by the fog, the fog forwards TS, H (K i TS), C i to the server.
At server side, for each timestamp and each registered device Q i , the value H (K i T S ) is computed. As a consequence, upon arrival of the message, the server can identify the origin of the device, link it with the stored key K i and decrypt C i in order to derive the message.
2) NON-ENCRYPTED COMMUNICATION
In this case, a device transmits the message M and timestamp TS accompanied with E GK (H (M TS) H (K i TS) H (M K i TS)). After receiving these messages, the fog verifies H (M TS) and in case of a positive verification, it forwards the received messages to the server. The second part allows precomputation at server side in order to facilitate the identification of the transmitting entity which can be verified by the third part.
V. RUBIN-LOGIC BASED VERIFICATION
This section formally verifies the proposed scheme, i.e., the group authentication and key agreement scheme, using the RUBIN logic as it is very close to the actual implementation of the protocol. Note that we have directly adopted RUBIN logic from [54]-[56].
A. BACKGROUND OF RUBIN LOGIC
Rubin logic integrates protocol analysis with specifications and uses the notions of global sets, local sets, and actions, as follows.
1) GLOBAL SET
The Global Set comprises of various sets that are required to represent information in the protocol. The content of the global sets may change as the protocol is running. Moreover, these sets are public to each principal in a protocol specification.
1) Principal Set: It contains the information of principals who participate in a protocol. 2) Rule Set: It contains inference rules and how to derive new statements from existing assertions. 3) Secret Set: This set refers to all the secrets that exist at any given time in the system. 4) Observer set: It contains all principals who possibly know the secrets by listening to the communication channel.
2) LOCAL SET
A Local Set comprises of various sets that are private to each participant and it consists of the following: 
3) Seen set (P i ):
It contains plaintext message that P i can see from messages sent over the network and it also contains a copy of the information. 4) Behavior list (P i ): It contains elements list. BL = AL, bev 1 , bev 2 , ...bev n , here AL is a list of actions, which are executed by P i and bev k is a pair, i.e., (message, AL). Note that the action list has two types of messages: Send (P i , message) and Receive (P i , message). 5) Haskeys set (P i ): It contains keys that P i can see, either as they are in an initial possession set or as they appear in a message sent across the communication and are added to the Seen set of P i .
3) ACTIONS
The actions are paramount operations, which are used in the protocol specification. These actions are basically used to control the state of knowledge and possessions for involved entities. Considering our requirements, following actions are defined as shown in Table 1 .
4) INFERENCE RULES
We defined the inference rules that are required as per our requirements. Note that these rules are directly adopted from [54] . Moreover, in order to understand the inference rules, few notations are adopted: X contain Y: Y appears as a sub-message of X; S:= F(S) : S is replaced by the value of F(S); X from P: X is received from P; and LINK(N): this formula basically links a response to a challenge (e.g., if a principal generates a fresh signature or a fresh nonce) then N is added to the belief set of the principal [54] . 1) Message-meaning rule: This set is defined for each principal, i.e., F, S, and D, respectively. As the communication is being initiated by F, we start as follows.
F13: Derive (GK ) and (P 1 , ..., P n ) F14: Send(D, P 1 ...P n ) F15: Update(GK , P 1 , ..., P n ) F16:
Following the group authentication and key agreement phase and the protocol specifications, the actions in BL(F) are executed first as the Fog (F) is initiator of the proposed scheme. The first action (F1) generates r f ; the third action (F3) sends M ReqFog , ID f , {R f } d f to the server (S). Next, (S1)-(S10) actions in BL(S) are performed to verify signature, generate nonce, and compute K i , K i , K f , K f . The action S9 sends M ReqSer , {R f , R s , H (GK )} d ser to F and then S updates GK , K f , and K i in action S10. Nevertheless, the local sets of server (S) are changed as described below: 
) } Now the global sets are updated as follows:
Observer(K If verification fails then the system will be aborted, otherwise F goes on with the next action. It derives GK and P 1 ...P n and sends P 1 ...P n to D. However, the local sets of F are changed as follows. It derives GK , checks H (GK ) with the stored value. It then chooses an updated random value w i called w n i , performs the actions in D13 -D16 and sends W i , W n i , s to F. The local sets of D are finally changed as follows. 
Now the global sets are updated as follows:
• Secret set: {GK , h} • Observer sets:
Observer(GK ): {F,D,S} Observer(h): {F,D} After receiving message in action S11, S performs few actions (S12 -S14) in BL(S). In S12, it computes h verifies sG and if this verification is successful, S finally updates its own database. The local sets of S are changed as follows. • The group key GK is only possessed by the legitimate entities, e.g., F, S, and Ds.
• F, S, and D are mutually verified and authenticated through the signatures during the protocol execution.
• h can only be computed by the legitimate entities F, S, and Ds. This verifies the security claims for the proposed scheme.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We start with an informal analysis. For that, we need to verify if all requirements, stated in section III-C, are satisfied.
• Authentication:
First in the initialisation phase, the device needs to be ensured that it is connected to a legitimated fog, the fog needs the guarantee that the device is legitimate, and the server is required to know that it is connected to the device claiming to be the one with that particular public key. We consider both the static and dynamic topology. Static topology: With the usage of the public key of the server, the device is able to send securely its public key to the server. Since it includes a hash value including an instance of the ECDHP, only the server can indeed validate that the message is coming from the device claiming to possess that public key. By sending the credentials of the fog and including the result of the new public key in the hash function, the device is ensured that the credentials are correct since only the server (and the device) is able to generate this hash value. The fog is ensured about the new device, since it is informed by the server through a message signed by its private key. Dynamic topology: Since the device is in possession of the public key of the server, it can securely initialise the procedure with the server, using the broadcast data that it received from the fog. However, the device still needs confirmation of the server that this data is correct. When receiving the message by the device, the server is the only entity able to retrieve the public key Q i of the device due to the ECDHP and to compute the corresponding new public key Q f i . Again, as it is the only entity in possession of v f , the server is the only one able to derive this key due to ECDHP. After verifying the hash included in the encrypted message, it can assure the device that it is connected to a legitimate fog. In order to do that, it sends Q f i , TS to the fog, encrypted with a key only derivable by the fog due to the ECDHP. As a consequence, the fog is ensured that Q f i is coming from a valid request since it was part of the original message sent by the device in the form of a hash value. Also the device has the guarantee that fog, server and members in the network of the fog are aware of its correct presence, as only the server was able to derive the correct public key. The next step is the update request. As both the fog and server are sending the message together with a signature on it, authentication is clear. The authentication of the devices in sending their response during the response phase is also evident due to the inclusion of the hash value and the ECDHP. The authenticity in the response of the fog can be verified by the devices after computing the resulting group key. If the hash of this group key corresponds with the part of the message sent in the original update request of the server, the devices are ensured that the intended fog is included in the process. Finally, as in the acknowledgement the unique pairwise keys are used, the fog and server have the guarantee that they are coming from the intended device.
Note that this feature guarantees protection against manin-the-middle attacks and impersonation attacks. Moreover, also replay attacks are impossible, due to the usage of unique random values and timestamps.
• Integrity:
The integrity of the messages is guaranteed due to the fact that hash values are included at all critical points in the protocol in order to detect at an early stage potential problems. Often, a hash value is sent beforehand (e.g. new public key in initialisation during dynamic topology, group key), which is then later verified after receiving additional information.
• Anonymity and unlinkability: Anonymity follows from the fact that each time a device is connected to the fog, it generates a new public key, which is unlinkable to the original [53] . In the initialisation for the dynamic topology, the ECDHP is exploited in order to share in an anonymous way the identity of the entity.
• Group forward secrecy: If one of the long-term private keys of the devices or fog is leaked, access is no longer allowed to group communication content. When an attacker is collecting the points (P 1 , ..., P n ), in order to form the group key from it, an additional point is required. Therefore, either the combination of private and random local variable (d f i , w i ) of one of the devices, or the combination (d f , r f ) of the fog can be used. Since, these random values are temporarily stored in devices and fog, even with leakage of the private keys, the group keys cannot be derived.
• Backward Confidentiality: Devices who join the group cannot get the former group keys from its present key. When a device joins later on, its key material is not yet included in the previous group keys. Moreover, during the construction and the acknowledgement, the group key is only sent under hash construction, and thus is not possible to retrieve in case of a collision resistant hash function.
• Perfect forward secrecy: Previous group keys should be still secure even if the long-term secrets are compromised by the attacker. As explained before in the group forward secrecy scheme, even if all private keys of the devices and the fog are leaked, the scheme is still secure as it heavily relies on the random and temporarily stored values (w i ) i , r f .
• By the end of the process, both fog and server are ensured that all entities of the group possess the required group key. This follows from the acknowledgement phase.
• The devices in the group are ensured that the fog has a secure relation with the server. This follows from the fact that the hash of the group key, originally present in the first message of the server, and actually signed by the server, corresponds with the group key computed based on the information sent by the fog. If the fog had not a secure relation with the server, it would not have been able to derive the required material for the construction of the group key.
• By the end of the process, both a group key among all entities and a common pairwise key between device and fog, between device and server, and between fog and server, are derived. The pairwise key between device and fog equals to K f i , between device and server to K i , and between fog and server to K f . These keys are only known to the involved entities due to the ECDHP.
VII. PERFORMANCE
We here consider both performance from computational and communication point of view.
A. COMPUTATIONAL COSTS
The computational costs are dominated by the most compute intensive operations, being EC multiplication, EC additions, encryption and hash, denoted by T m , T a , T e , T h . Note that we aim for 128-bit security and use the appropriate parameters for that in the choice of the EC, the hash function SHA256 and AES128. The performance of these operations are evaluated on three different platforms, corresponding to the roles of edge devices, fog and server. To be more concrete, the Zolertia RE-mote ARM Cortex-M3 @ 32MHz, 32KB RAM is used as edge device, the Raspberry Pi 3B Quad Core 1.2GHz, 1GB RAM as fog, and a Personal Computer Intel Core i7-8750H CPU @ 2.2GHz, 16GB RAM as server. Table 2 provides the timings for these four operations using the specified libraries. Table 3 provides an overview of the required cryptographic operations for the different phases in the scheme. As there are no other group authentication schemes for such fog architecture, we give as information the performance of the scheme in [43] , proposing an anonymous pairwise mutual authentication scheme for a fog architecture. If we focus on the most constrained device, being the edge, we can conclude that our scheme is in the same range as [43] . As our scheme is a group authentication scheme, the complexity at fog and cloud server is higher in our scheme. However, if n=1, the complexity becomes more or less similar to [43] . Figure 6 illustrates the computational complexity for the fog and the server, using the measurements of Table 3 for a varying number of devices. The computational cost for the fog goes from 418 ms with one device to 1789 ms for ten devices to execute the group authentication and key agreement. For the server, it will take between 16 ms for one device up to 99 ms for ten devices. We consider these costs to be reasonable. For the scalability of the system, we assume that in cases where more devices are present, there should be a more powerful fog or the number of fogs should be increased to keep the delay acceptable.
B. COMMUNICATION COSTS
For the communication, we measure the size of the messages, both in the initialisation phase and in the group authentication phase. We assume the length of the TS to be equal to 32 bits, the result of the SHA256 equals to 256 bits, an EC point transmitted using 257 bits and a message request update of 4 bits. For the initialisation phase, both in the static and dynamic topology, we need a total of 1925 bits. For the group authentication phase, the total required number of bits to be sent equals to 2605 + 1668n, with n the number of devices in the group. Compared with [43] , where a total of 3264 bits is required, this amount is certainly acceptable. A detailed calculation of these numbers can be found in Table 4 . Note that the content of M 1, ..., M 6 are shown in Figure 7 .
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an efficient and novel authentication and key agreement mechanism for a set of IoT devices handled by a fog and managed by a server. In particular, the fog is considered to be potentially vulnerable to attacks and requires special attention in order not to leak sensitive information. After an initialization phase which is either static or dynamic, the authentication is carried on using the participants' public key. Finally, a group key is derived by all parties (devices, fog and server). We have used Rubin logic to show how throughout the execution of the protocol, no outsider is capable to derive any information on the secret key. The protocol also ensures authentication, integrity, anonymity and unlinkability, group forward secrecy, backward confidentiality, and perfect forward secrecy. As we believe that the fog architecture will become increasingly popular for its advantages, the proposed mechanisms can be used for authentication and key agreement purposes dealing with group authentication in a multitude of application domains like smart grid, vehicular networks, smart health care systems, smart cities, etc.
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